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QUALITY OF THE APPLICATIONS PROCESSED

In the course of my investigation, each of the 89 applications in question were reviewed to identify matters such as the type of application, the case officer and agent involved, and the time frame within which the application was decided. That review produced the statistics which have formed the basis for this report. I did not, however, speak to the applicants who made the 50 applications that my investigation has focused on, nor did I analyse or investigate each verification process by, for instance, contacting third parties who were referred to in each application. That would have been a significant, time-consuming and expensive task, and in my view, unnecessary to complete my investigation adequately. However, on the basis of the information that the review of the applications produced, and the interviews and other tasks I undertook, I am able to make a number of observations about quality.

Given the number of applications, the pressure on staff to process applications quickly, and the actual processing times that were achieved, there will, in my view, be quality issues with at least some of these applications. I note that some of the files were not in the best state, which I believe supports this observation about quality.

However, I accept that it might be difficult, and even unfair, to assess these applications against today's standards. Mr Carley advised me that the verification standards and processes now employed by the NZIS are far more sophisticated and reliable than they were in 2002. (I note also that changes have been made to the relevant policies).

I observe that the NZIS, in part at least, had already made similar observations about quality during 2002 and recommended various changes. In approximately November 2002, Andrew Lockhart, the Chief Operating Officer at the time, completed a report entitled "Governance Arrangements in Business Migration Branch". Mr Lockhart advised me that he was asked by the then General Manager, Chris Hampton to prepare this report. In the report, Mr Lockhart stated that the report's purpose was to:

"[Look] at the overall governance with in [sic] the Branch to provide assurance the leadership and systems support the quality of decision required in line with policy objectives and the outcomes framework. The review covers all the work undertaken by the Branch including the work of the Employer Accreditation Unit."

In the report, Mr Lockhart states that his findings were based on interviews with the Service Manager, and the two Service Leaders, and the documentation that they provided in those interviews.

The main findings that Mr Lockhart made were:

• The BMB leadership (the Service Manager and Service Leaders) was principally focused on productivity and the reduction of the backlog over the shortest period;
• Although there were systems in place to maintain "quality" (Mr Lockhart does not define this term), there was a risk that the BMB leadership was not doing enough to reinforce the need for "quality";
• There was no benchmark, or general standard, against which the quality of applications could be assessed. Although there was a template which case officers used, which identified the factors taken into account and the reasons for a particular decision, and also a "second person check" for applications leading to residency, Mr Lockhart considered that "these systems do not however provide a benchmark or overall standard against which the key elements of policy can be balanced";
• Although the BMB did have relationships with consultants, banks, and professional groups such as accountants and solicitors, Mr Lockhart's view was that the BMB did not have a external reference group that assisted in reinforcing quality decision-making in the BMB. The relationships that did exist presented a risk, because consultants could attempt to make policy (or presumably the application of policy) less stringent;
• At the time of the report, there was a "considerable" backlog in the BMB, and the BMB had reached maximum capacity despite the recruitment of additional staff.

Mr Lockhart's recommendations were:

• Greater leadership by the BMB managers to reinforce quality standards and systems;
• Development and implementation of a benchmark or quality standard against which LTBV applications could be assessed;
• Review of a previous decision to carry out all business case assessments within the BMB, rather than using KPMG;
• Immediate reintroduction of the "quality assurance programme" for LTBVs;
• completion of performance management documents for 2002 and 2003, as well as the inclusion in those documents of objectives to reinforce quality decision-making.

It seems to me that if not expressly, then at least impliedly (see in particular the recommendations reproduced in the preceding paragraph), the report represents acceptance by the NZIS that, at that time, quality may have been suffering in order to increase productivity, or at least, that processes were suffering which in turn did or could have affected quality.

On 21 January 2003, Mr Carley took over as Service Manager. In January 2003, he merged the two teams and moved to chronological processing of applications only. He advised me that he saw nothing inherently wrong with non-chronological processing, particularly in the conditions that prevailed in 2002, but he did comment that processing other than chronologically does leave the NZIS open to allegations of favouritism. He also noted that, on his arrival, and because of policy changes, the number of incoming applications had dropped off dramatically and, as a result, the entire operation became easier to manage.

I note also that since 2002 the NZIS has established the Central Verification Unit. Undoubtedly, the level of verification now in play is more thorough and sophisticated than it was in 2002, when verification was primarily the responsibility of each case officer.

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