Review of the Employment Relationship Problem Resolution System

Office of the Minister of Labour

Cabinet Economic Development Committee

Purpose

1. This report responds to Cabinet's invitation to me as Minister of Labour to report to the Cabinet Economic Development Committee on options to improve the functioning of the employment relationship problem resolution system [CAB Min (07) 14/6 refers].
2. This paper proposes that the Department of Labour be directed to undertake further work on six options to achieve this outcome, and that I would report to Cabinet Economic Development Committee on this further work by July 2008. The further work associated with four of these options involves possible fiscal implications and if work on these is agreed to, Budget bids will be developed for Budget 2009, if the further work undertaken supports this. This paper also proposes work to start now to develop a code of employment practice around employment relationship problem resolution.

Background

3. This paper responds to:
   1. Cabinet's invitation to me (described above) which arose from Cabinet's consideration of the second milestone report of the Quality Regulation Review on 30 July 2007;
   2. the Department of Labour's ("the Department") work programme to identify the scope of the issues around personal grievances and the role of employment relations consultants in encouraging personal grievance claims. (noted by Cabinet Business Committee in July 2006 [CBC Min (06) 12/6 refers]);
   3. concerns about representation fees and "no win, no fee" representation arrangements; and
   4. the Small Business Advisory Group's February 2006 proposal of an "alternative dispute resolution process" which the Government committed to examine [CBC (06) 245 and CBC Min (06) 17/23 refers].
4. This paper does not consider the adequacy of remedies for employment relationship problems, or a "personal grievance free period".

Executive Summary

5. This paper assesses how the employment relationship problem resolution system is currently functioning when measured against its objects through: the use of Department of Labour service delivery experience, Department of Labour analysis and research, how the system is seen to be working, and consultation with Business New Zealand, the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions and the Small Business Advisory Group.
6. The overall assessment is that the employment relationship problem resolution system is meeting its objectives, but could be doing better. This paper examines the following issues:
   1. Representation fees and "no win, no fee" arrangements;
   2. Perceived bias in the system;
   3. The cost of problem resolution;
   4. Ensuring access to justice;
   5. Negative impact of delays; and
   6. Employment relationship problems appear to impact disproportionately on small or medium enterprises.
7. After assessing a range of options to improve the functioning of the employment relationship problem resolution system against high-level objectives and criteria, I recommend the following combination of options to better support the functioning of the system, while preserving its integrity as a whole:
   • The development of a Code of Employment Practice (which could have a specific focus for small businesses) relating to employment relationship problem resolution
   • Further work to scope and progress the following:
     • Increasing educational resources and support for employees, employers and their representatives;
     • Improving Department of Labour guidance for employers and employees on employment relationship problem resolution and termination of employment;
     • Exploring the extent to which the quality of paid representation by employment advocates (excluding practising barristers and solicitors) could be better assured. This work would include exploring how to ensure that representation by these advocates is high quality by either;
       • requiring that these advocates belong to a relevant membership organisation, union or employers' association; or
       • by promoting to the public the use of these advocates who belong to a relevant membership organisation, union, or employers' association with professional standards and/or code of ethics;
     • Assessing whether provisions in the Employment Relations Act for reducing remedies to reflect substantive justification and contributory conduct are effective;
     • Assessing how the provisions relating to a "[mediator] decision by authority of the parties" (section 150 ERA) could be strengthened to encourage its use in cases where an agreement cannot be reached and to discourage the unreasonable withholding of consent by either party;
     • Increasing the capacity of the Department of Labour to deliver mediation services and improve the capability of its mediators to respond to improve services, as identified in the Department's Mediation Practice Development Project (strengthening mediation practice);
     • Exploring options to reduce the time taken in the investigation and determination of cases in the Employment Relations Authority, including by considering changes to Authority processes.
8. The cumulative effect of these options would be to enhance the professionalism of advocates; better inform employees and employers (and their representatives); better manage employment relationship problems at a firm level and increase confidence in and use of informal resolution processes; and reduce the cost of and length of time taken to resolve employment relationship problems using formal processes.
9. I have also examined the Small Business Advisory Group's proposed "Employment Facilitation Process" option and consider that it should not be pursued in light of the work outlined above.

Objectives of the employment relationship problem resolution system under the Employment Relations Act 2000

10. The overall object of the Employment Relations Act 2000 ("the Act") is to build productive employment relationships through the promotion of good faith in all aspects of the employment environment and of the employment relationship, by (amongst other things):
    1. recognising that employment relationships must be built not only on the implied mutual obligations of trust and confidence, but also on a requirement for good faith behaviour;
    2. acknowledging and addressing the inherent inequality of power in employment relationships;
    3. promoting mediation as the primary problem-solving mechanism; and
    4. reducing the need for judicial intervention.
11. Part 9 of the Act provides the procedures and mechanisms for resolving personal grievances and disputes between employers and employees, and the principles and assumptions underpinning the employment relationship problem resolution system ("the system") thus established. An employment relationship problem includes a personal grievance, a dispute and any other problem relating to or arising out of an employment relationship, but does not include any problem with the fixing of new terms and conditions of employment.
12. The object of Part 9 of the Act is to:
    1. recognise that, in resolving employment relationship problems, access to both information and mediation services is more important than adherence to rigid formal procedures;
    2. recognise that employment relationship problems are more likely to be resolved quickly and successfully if the problems are first raised and discussed directly between the parties to the relationship;
    3. continue to give special attention to personal grievances, and to facilitate the raising of personal grievances with employers;
    4. recognise the importance of reinstatement as a remedy; and
    5. ensure that the role of the Employment Relations Authority ("the Authority") and the Court in resolving employment relationship problems is to determine the rights and obligations of the parties rather than to fix terms and conditions of employment.
13. In 2004 the Act was amended to strengthen the system by:
    1. ensuring any settlements in mediation are paid directly to the parties rather than to their representative (as was previous common practice), although this does not prevent a payment being made to the other party's solicitor;
    2. allowing mediators to talk to parties without their representatives present, and to express their views on the substance of a claim or the process being followed; and
    3. providing access to dispute resolution services for parties in work-related relationships that are not employment relationships, for example contractors.

How the system is performing against its objectives

1. My assessment as to how the system is currently functioning when measured against its objects is based on four sources of 'evidence':
   1. Department of Labour service delivery experience;
   2. Department of Labour analysis and research;
   3. how the system is seen to be working (experience and perception); and
   4. consultation with Business New Zealand, the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions and the Small Business Advisory Group, as detailed in paragraph 23.

A) Department of Labour service delivery experience

15. The Department provides mediation services to help people resolve employment relationship problems quickly and effectively. The Department's first priority is to prevent employment relationship problems occurring in the first place by providing information and guidance to help employers and employees develop and maintain productive employment relationships. If there are problems that employers and employees are unable to resolve themselves, they can approach the Department for assistance. This can be provided in a range of ways including the provision of further information (e.g. the Contact Centre), facilitation, educational events and programmes, or mediation.
16. If the parties reach agreement (whether with the help of a mediator or not), they can ask a mediator to sign the agreement. The mediator will explain to the parties that, once signed, the agreement becomes final and binding and cannot be challenged. Such an agreement is enforceable in the Authority or the Employment Court, and there are penalties for breaching it.
17. The parties may also agree, in writing, to the mediator making a final and binding decision under section 150 of the Act. The mediator will explain to the parties that once a decision is made, that decision is enforceable and cannot be challenged.
18. If a problem is not resolved at mediation, the parties can go to the Authority which will investigate and make a determination for the parties. The Authority operates in an informal way and makes a decision based on the merits of the case, not on legal technicalities. If either party is unhappy with an Authority determination, the matter can be heard in the Employment Court.
19. This service delivery experience, particularly at mediation, has given the Department valuable insights into issues around the operation of the system. The Department receives around 9,000 applications for mediation services and around 2,000 applications for the Authority each year.

B) Department of Labour analysis and research

20. The Department has examined the area of employment relationship problem resolution and identified issues. This paper draws on the following (considered in more detail in Appendix 1):
    1. a survey of 852 private sector employers, of whom 130 had experienced employment relationship problems during the previous 12 months;
    2. focus group project involving employers;
    3. case study project of 14 employers and employees;
    4. a survey of mediations carried out over a five week period in 2006; and
    5. a review of 33 determinations in the Authority over the same period.

C) Perception and anecdote

21. During the Department's analysis and research employers raised various issues, including views that the system favours employees. The Transport and Industrial Relations Committee, in the context of the Employment Relations (Probationary Employment) Amendment Bill, noted that "no win, no fee" representation for personal grievance claims has complicated this area of employment relations. Employers and employer organisations have also frequently raised their concern about the system with me directly.
22. These perceptions, even if they tell only a part of the story, undermine the credibility of the overall system and may act to discourage people from participating in it. Accordingly, I have taken these perceptions seriously, and they form one of the sources of evidence informing my review of how the system is functioning.

D) Consultation with Business New Zealand, the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions and the Small Business Advisory Group

23. In order to inform this review, the Department sought the views of Business New Zealand, the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions and the Small Business Advisory Group about the functioning of the employment relationship problem resolution system generally and more specifically about:
    1. the availability of information;
    2. whether a Code of Employment Practice should be developed;
    3. the professionalism of representatives, the costs of representation and access to justice issues; and
    4. the impact of "no win, no fee" representation arrangements.
24. Feedback from these organisations has been reflected in the development of the options assessed in this paper. A summary of feedback from these organisations is attached at Appendix 4.

Overall Assessment: The system is meeting its objectives ... but it could be doing better ...

25. The following issues have emerged as a result of this work (and are discussed in more detail in Appendix 2):

Representation fees and "no win, no fee" arrangements

1. concerns about the use of different fee arrangements, their possible positive impact on access to justice and whether this has increased the number of employment relationship problems

Perceived bias in the system

2. both employers and employees tend to believe that the employment relationship problem resolution system is biased against them

The cost of problem resolution

3. employers tend to believe that it is expensive to resolve employment relationship problems

Ensuring access to justice

4. concerns about ensuring that advice or representation to assist with resolving an employment relationship problem is affordable (including the types of fees used and availability of legal aid)

Negative impact of delays

5. there can be negative impacts for parties if delays are experienced between the time it takes from when an employment relationship problem first comes to an employer's attention until it is resolved, and once parties have accessed the more formal resolution options of mediation or the Authority

Employment relationship problems appear to impact disproportionately on small or medium enterprises (SMEs)

6. resolving employment relationship problems appears to have a greater proportional effect on SMEs than it does on larger employers, including in terms of resources dedicated to resolving the problem, reduced productivity and impact on other staff.
    
26. These issues are not always clear cut, and in some cases it is difficult to balance the trade-offs they represent, for instance, the use of "no win, no fee" representatives can give access to justice to people who may otherwise not access it, but, on the other hand, this usage is considered by others to have created dubious incentives.

Improvements needed to better support the functioning of the system, while preserving its integrity as a whole

27. Issues raised (including as evidenced through public perception) have been to do with the functioning of the system, but not with the core principles that underpin it. I consider it critical that in making any changes to the functioning of the system these principles, and the integrity of the system as a whole, are preserved.
28. To better support the functioning of the employment relationship problem resolution system established in the Act, I consider we need to:
    1. reduce the vulnerability of the system to negative criticism (including but not limited to perception/anecdote);
    2. improve the effectiveness of the system in meeting its objectives; and
    3. work to preserve the integrity of the system as a whole.
29. In addition to these high-level objectives, I have also identified the following criteria against which I have assessed a range of options to improve the functioning of the system. These are:
    1. will the option enhance the credibility and perceptions of fairness of the system?
    2. will the option enhance the system's effectiveness, including providing the parties with an enhanced understanding of the system?
    3. does the option address the inherent imbalance of power between parties?
    4. does the option preserve the right of access to justice?

Options

30. I have assessed 14 options (being options proposed by officials and an option proposed by the Small Business Advisory Group) against the criteria listed above, and in the context of the framework described above. The option proposed by SBAG is discussed below. The options proposed by officials are analysed in Appendix 3.

"Employment Facilitation Process": An alternative dispute resolution process, proposed by Small Business Advisory Group

31. In response to the issues faced by SMEs in resolving employment relationship problems, the Small Business Advisory Group ("SBAG") suggested an alternative dispute resolution system which they call the Employment Facilitation Process (EFP). In response, the government committed to examining SBAG's suggestions on options for streamlining grievance procedures and the degree to which they can deliver the certainty, in terms of process and outcome, that employers are seeking, while not removing rights and protections from employees. [CBC (06) 245 and CBC Min (06) 17/23 refers].
32. The EFP was intended to make it easier for employers to take on new staff in the knowledge that they can be released if unsuitable, to lessen disputes arising from new employment situations, to lessen costs associated with a class of disputes, and to bring some degree of parity with most OECD countries which have grievance free probationary periods. The EFP would allow the parties to agree (in the employment agreement) to a probation period of up to 12 months during which the EFP process would apply instead of the provisions under the Act. Briefly, this process involves the parties exchanging written statements of their points of dispute, meeting to discuss these, and if unable to reach resolution, submitting their case in writing to a Department of Labour mediator. The mediator would then call a meeting with the parties and would seek to mediate a settlement. If a settlement could not be reached, the mediator would be empowered to make a binding decision.
33. The EFP process would exclude representatives from the mediated meeting (although they can give prior advice). Cash settlements would be restricted to the equivalent of twice the termination period in the employment agreement, and in the event the parties did not settle at mediation, and the mediator had to make a decision, a maximum amount of $250 may be added to the settlement amount to recognise costs incurred. Limited rights of appeal to the District Court would apply if the mediator conducted the proceedings in a way that prejudiced the outcome.

Consultation on the proposal

34. Business New Zealand raised concerns that employee agreement would be required and may not be forthcoming in sufficient numbers to justify the set-up costs; allowing mediators to ignore normal legal rules is not consistent with the concepts of natural justice; mediators are selected for their facilitatory skills and are not trained to be arbitrators; and the process would be resource-intensive and would result in converging skill sets for mediators and Authority members.
35. The New Zealand Council of Trade Unions (NZCTU) raised concerns that contracting out of the dispute resolution process into a process with more limited remedies would reduce employee rights and access to justice; many employees would not be able to effectively participate in dispute resolution without proper advice and representation; facilitated mediation differs fundamentally from the imposed decision-making of arbitration; there is no principled basis to use an arbitrary formula which would deny an employee money due to them; and there is an absence of principled parameters for arbitrated decisions.
36. The NZCTU commented that if the parties agree, a mediator may already be empowered to determine disputes under section 150 of the Act. The NZCTU believes that if this power was more widely promoted and used it could allow for minor matters to be dealt with in a timelier and less expensive way. This paper proposes further work to assess the use in mediation of section 150 ("[mediator] decision by authority of parties") in appropriate cases, and whether this provision is useful and effective in mediation and, if so, how its use can be improved.

Comment

37. The Department considers that the EFP would create a "two-tier" problem resolution system with differing processes for probationary and other employees. The EFP would remove access to rights conferred by the existing employment relationship problem resolution system, and does not address the inherent power inequality in employment relationships as recognised under the Act. It also emphasises written statements which may disadvantage parties with low literacy and increase reliance on representatives. Research from Britain, where a broadly similar system operates, is that such a prescribed process may create incentives to escalate cases rather than encouraging problem resolution. The Department is also concerned that the EFP significantly limits the current rights of appeal. In addition, the Department considers that the EFP will disadvantage vulnerable workers, cap remedies and not provide for compensation for hurt and humiliation. Nonetheless two of the options analysed in Appendix 3 specifically consider elements of the EFP, namely restricting the right to be represented in mediation, and placing limits on available settlement amounts. These two options have not been recommended as preferred options.
38. Given the concerns raised by social partners and the Department, and in light of other work outlined above, I recommend that the Employment Facilitation Process not be pursued.

Preferred options

39. My assessment of the options against the criteria and in the context of the framework described in paragraphs 28 and 29, leads me to recommend the following combination of options to better support the functioning of the employment relationship problem resolution system (the assessment of these options, and other options proposed by officials, is set out in Appendix 3) :
    1. Option 2: increase educational resources and support for productive employment relationships and the management of employment relationship problems, in order to improve workplace productivity, firm capability and decrease the incidence of employment relationship problems or their impacts. This will include improvement of the Department of Labour's guidance for employers and employees on employment relationship problem resolution and termination of employment;
    2. Option 3(b) or Option 4: Exploring the extent to which the quality of paid representation by employment advocates (excluding practising barristers and solicitors) could be better assured. This work would include exploring how to ensure that representation by advocates is high quality by either;
       1. requiring that these advocates belong to a relevant membership organisation, union or employers' association; or
       2. by promoting to the public the use of these advocates who belong to a relevant membership organisation, union, or employers' association with professional standards and/or code of ethics;
    3. Option 6A: assess whether provisions in the Act for reducing remedies to reflect substantive justification and contributory conduct are effective, in order to reduce the vulnerability of the system to criticism, maintain its credibility and preserve its integrity;
    4. Option 7: develop a Code of Employment Practice (which could have a specific focus for small businesses) relating to employment relationship problem resolution to provide guidance on the application of the Act, in order to preserve the integrity of the system and improve its effectiveness in meeting its objectives. The purpose of a code under the Act is to provide guidance on the application of the Act, either generally or in relation to particular types of situations, or in relation to particular parts or areas of the employment environment. The effect of such a code in this context would be to minimise the escalation of employment relationship problems to formal institutions;
    5. Option 8: Assess how the provisions relating to a "[mediator] decision by authority of the parties" (section 150 ERA) could be strengthened to encourage its use in cases where an agreement cannot be reached and to discourage the unreasonable withholding of consent by either party;
    6. Option 9: Increasing the capacity of the Department of Labour to deliver mediation services and improve the capability of its mediators to respond to improve services, as identified in the Department's Mediation Practice Development Project (strengthening mediation practice); and
    7. Option 10: explore options to reduce the time taken in the investigation and determination of cases in the Authority, including by considering changes to Authority processes, in order to expedite employment relationship problem resolution and improve the effectiveness of the system in meeting its objectives.
40. The cumulative effect of my preferred options will be to:
    1. enhance the professionalism of advocates;
    2. better inform employees and employers (and their representatives);
    3. better manage employment relationship problems at a firm level and increase confidence in and use of informal resolution processes; and
    4. reduce the cost of and length of time taken to resolve employment relationship problems using formal processes.
41. With the exception of option 7 (develop a code of employment practice), which I would like officials to start working on immediately, I am proposing that further work is done before agreeing to progressing the options. This further work would include scoping the options in detail (including problem definition), cost benefit analysis, determining how they may be delivered and by whom (e.g. education and training activities under option 2 could be delivered by the Department, employer's organisations, unions, or other organisations), and the level of change or increase that would be optimal. It would also include further analysis of administrative data to identify where improvements could best be made.
42. In addition, the further work arising from options 2, 9 and 10 have (or may have) fiscal implications, and would require additional funding. If the further work supports the implementation of these options, I would develop Budget bids for options 2, 9 and 10 that would be considered in the context of Budget 2009 (and other related bids). If the Department is directed to do further work on options 3(b) or 4, I will include the quantification of any fiscal costs as part of my proposed July 2008 report back. This may result in the development of a Budget bid that would be considered in the context of Budget 2009 (and other related bids).

Consultation

43. The following government agencies were consulted during the preparation of this paper and their views taken into account: Ministry of Youth Development, Te Puni Kokiri, Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs, Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of Social Development, Treasury, Ministry of Women's Affairs, State Services Commission and Ministry of Justice. The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet was informed of the paper.
44. In addition, officials received comments on the key issues raised in this paper from the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, Small Business Advisory Group and Business New Zealand. A summary of comments is attached at Appendix 4.

Fiscal implications

45. There are no direct fiscal implications arising from this paper. The further work on options 2, 3(b), 4, 9 and 10 may have fiscal implications. If the Department is directed to do further work on options 2, 9 or 10, and if that work requires additional funding, I would develop Budget bids for these options that would be considered in the context of Budget 2009 (and other related bids). If the Department is directed to do further work on options 3(b) or 4, I will include the quantification of any fiscal costs as part of my proposed July 2008 report back. This may result in the development of a Budget bid that would be considered in the context of Budget 2009 (and other related bids).

Human rights

46. The proposals contained in this Cabinet Paper appear to be consistent with the rights and freedoms affirmed in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993. However, one of the options for improving the functioning of the employment relationship problem resolution system involves exploring the extent to which the quality of paid representation by employment advocates (excluding practising barristers and solicitors) could be better assured. This work would include exploring how to ensure that representation by these advocates is high quality by either requiring that these advocates belong to a relevant membership organisation, union or employers' association (option 3(b)); or by promoting to the public the use of these advocates who belong to a relevant membership organisation, union, or employers' association with professional standards and/or code of ethics (option 4). This might limit the freedom of association of advocates. Therefore, officials from the Ministry of Justice and the Department of Labour will work together on this issue to ensure consistency with section 17 (freedom of association) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.

Legislative implications

47. Four of the options recommended in this paper may have future legislative implications. These may arise from options 3(b), 6A, 8, 9 and 10 depending on the outcome of the further work for these options.
48. Three of the options which are not recommended in this paper would require legislative amendments to implement. These options are Option 3(a), 5 and 6.

Regulatory Impact Analysis

49. A Regulatory Impact Statement and Business Cost Compliance Statement has not been prepared as there are no regulatory impacts arising from the recommendations in this paper. A Regulatory Impact Statement will be developed when the Code, if progressed, is submitted to Cabinet for noting of my intention to approve it. A Regulatory Impact Statement will also be required if any legislative implications arise out of further work on the options.

Gender implications

50. There are no gender implications associated with the recommendations in this paper.

Recommendations

51. I recommend that the Cabinet Economic Development Committee:
    1. Note that this work is part of the Quality Regulations Review workstream [CAB Min (07) 14/6 refers]
    2. Note that the government committed to examining the Small Business Advisory Group's suggestions on options for streamlining grievance procedures and the degree to which they can deliver the certainty, in terms of process and outcome, that employers are seeking, while not removing rights and protections from employees. [CBC (06) 245 and CBC Min (06) 17/23 refers]
    3. Note that information is not available to confirm or dismiss the suggestion that "no win, no fee" employment advocates increase the number of personal grievances.
    4. Note that the incidence of employment relationship problems is higher amongst small or medium enterprises (SMEs), and that SME employers appear to find that the employment relationship problem resolution system involves unknown costs and time commitments that tend to lead them to "pay an employee out" instead of accessing processes or mechanisms provided for in the Employment Relations Act
    5. Note that this paper identifies the following issues:
       1. overall, the employment relationship problem resolution system is meeting its objectives, but there are improvements that could be made to better support how it functions. In making any changes, we would need to ensure that the integrity of the system as a whole is preserved
       2. employment relationship problems appear to impact heavily on SMEs. The main issues faced by SMEs in relation to the employment relationship problem resolution system seem to be a lack of information about employment relationship problem resolution, a lack of awareness of the options available, and the financial and time-commitment uncertainties associated with the formal process
       3. employees on low incomes or without the ready funds to engage representation paid for on an hourly basis tend to face a range of barriers (including insufficient information on available options and perceptions of the high cost of representation) to access justice when they want to resolve an employment relationship problem
    6. Agree that the Small Business Advisory Group's proposed "Employment Facilitation Process" not be pursued, in the light of the work being undertaken under recommendations 7 and 8.
    7. Direct the Department of Labour to start work to develop a Code of Employment Practice (which could have a specific focus for small businesses) relating to employment relationship problem resolution. Further consultation with such persons and organisations as I think appropriate, including relevant employer and employee interests, will be undertaken in this work.
    8. Direct the Department of Labour to undertake further work on six options for improving the functioning of the employment relationship problem resolution system, including quantifying any fiscal costs of these options
       1. Increasing educational resources and support for employees, employers and their representatives, including improving Department of Labour guidance for employers and employees on employment relationship problem resolution and termination of employment;
       2. Exploring the extent to which the quality of paid representation by employment advocates (excluding practising barristers and solicitors) could be better assured;
       3. Assessing whether provisions in the Employment Relations Act for reducing remedies to reflect substantive justification and contributory conduct are effective;
       4. Assessing how the provisions relating to a "[mediator] decision by authority of the parties" (section 150 ERA) could be strengthened to encourage its use in cases where an agreement cannot be reached and to discourage the unreasonable withholding of consent by either party;
       5. Increasing the capacity of the Department of Labour to deliver mediation services and improve the capability of its mediators to respond to improve services, as identified in the Department's Mediation Practice Development Project (strengthening mediation practice);
       6. Exploring options to reduce the time taken in the investigation and determination of cases in the Employment Relations Authority, including by considering changes to Authority processes.
    9. Note that I will report back to the Cabinet Economic Development Committee by July 2008 on the results of the Department's further work outlined in recommendations 7 and 8.
    10. Note the further work associated with the options outlined in recommendations 8.1, 8.5 and 8.6 may have fiscal implications that would require the development of Budget bids that would be considered in the context of Budget 2009 (and other related bids). These Budget bids would only proceed if the Department of Labour is directed to do that further work, and if the further work undertaken supported seeking additional funding.
    11. Note the further work associated with the options outlined in recommendation 8.2 may have fiscal implications. If the Department is directed to do further work on either of these options, I will include the quantification of any fiscal costs as part of my proposed July 2008 report back. This may result in the development of a Budget bid that would be considered in the context of Budget 2009 (and other related bids).

Hon Ruth Dyson
Minister of Labour

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